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1. Introduction 
Process industry, such as an offshore production, exposes person-
nel to risk of injury or fatality. Probability of fatality in real practical 
situations depends on many random events that may occur during a 
potential accident, which are difficult to quantify at a specific time 
instant or in the course of a time interval. This results in over- or 
under-estimation of risk.
After several disasters, Quantitative Risk Assessment methods 
were applied for evaluation of the risk [13] of injury or fatality due to 
an accident. All events potentially occurring during the accident are 
quantified, leading to an estimation of the risk of fatality. The quanti-
fication of the risk is very often carried out by the application of Event 
Trees [6]. Event Trees (ET) are relatively simple and easily under-
stood, but there are some disadvantages of using them, such as:
A hydrocarbon-related incident on a processing plant and the 
response to it by personnel working in the plant are time-dependent 
events whilst ET is a steady state method. An incident and the subse-
quent plant response evolve where the branches of the incident and re-
sponse sub-events are generated throughout the incident. This should 
be reflected by actions of personnel, with probabilities on both the 
incident/plant response side and the personnel side. Such interactions 
in a time-dependent manner are not possible to represent by Event 
Trees.
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Risk to safety of personnel in process industries is normally modelled by the application of Event Trees, where the risk is defined 
as a product of event frequency and its consequences. This method is steady state whilst the actual event is time dependent.  For 
example, gas release is an event comprising the size of gas cloud being released, probabilities of ignition, fire or explosion, fatality, 
escalation to new releases and fire and/or explosion, and the probability of fatality, all varying with time. This paper brings new 
perspective, how the risk to safety of personnel could be evaluated in dynamic context. A new approach is presented whereby the 
time-dependent events and the time-dependent probability of fatality are modelled by means of the analytical computation method 
based on modeling of different accident scenarios by use of the directed acyclic graph (DAG) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
method. Using these methods the modeled scenarios change with relevant probabilities at defined times to configurations with ap-
propriate probabilities of fatalities.The paper uses a realistic example from the offshore industry, where different sizes of leak have 
different probability characteristics. Specifically small, medium and large leaks are evaluated. Based on the dynamic evolution of 
the probability of fatality, it is concluded that the most dangerous leak is the large one. Probability of fatality caused by the leak 
increased very rapidly within first 5 minutes. At the end of 5th minute, there is approximately one order of magnitude difference in 
the probabilities of fatality associated with the respective leak sizes.
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Zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa pracowników w przemyśle przetwórczym jest zwykle modelowane za pomocą drzewa zdarzeń, 
gdzie ryzyko jest zdefiniowane jako iloczyn częstotliwości zdarzenia i jego skutków. Metoda ta dotyczy stanu stacjonarnego, pod-
czas gdy rzeczywiste zdarzenie jest zależne od czasu.  Na przykład, ulatnianie się gazu jest zdarzeniem, które wiąże się z wielkością 
obłoku uwalnianego gazu, prawdopodobieństwem zapłonu, pożaru lub wybuchu, śmiertelnością, eskalacją pod kątem dalszego 
wycieku i pożaru i/lub wybuchu, oraz prawdopodobieństwem ofiar śmiertelnych, w każdym przypadku zależnie od czasu. Niniejsza 
praca pokazuje nowe podejście do tego, jak zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa pracowników może być rozpatrywane w kontekście 
dynamicznym. Nowe metoda polega na tym, iż zdarzenia zależne od czasu i zależne od czasu prawdopodobieństwo śmiertelności 
są modelowane za pomocą analitycznej metody obliczeń opartej na modelowaniu różnych scenariuszy wypadków przez zastoso-
wanie skierowanego grafu acyklicznego (DAG) i metody analizy drzewa błędów (FTA). Dzięki zastosowaniu niniejszych metod, 
modelowane scenariusze zmieniają się wraz z odpowiednimi prawdopodobieństwami w określonych czasach na konfiguracje 
z właściwymi prawdopodobieństwami śmiertelności. Artykuł wykorzystuje rzeczywisty przykład z branży morskiej, gdzie różne 
rozmiary wycieku wykazują różne parametry prawdopodobieństwa. Szczegółowo oceniane są małe, średnie i duże wycieki. W 
oparciu o dynamiczną ewolucję prawdopodobieństwa ofiar śmiertelnych, należy stwierdzić, że najbardziej niebezpieczny jest duży 
wyciek. Prawdopodobieństwo ofiar śmiertelnych spowodowanych wyciekiem gwałtownie wzrasta w ciągu pierwszych 5 minut. 
Na koniec 5. minuty, występuje różnica w przybliżeniu o jeden rząd wielkości w prawdopodobieństwie śmiertelności związanej z 
odpowiednimi wielkościami wycieku.
Słowa kluczowe: Ryzyko pożarowe związane z węglowodorami; przemysł morski; modelowanie ryzyka w zależ-
ności od czasu; skierowany graf acykliczny
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and Reliability 2015; 17 (4): 582–590, http://dx.doi.org/10.17531/ein.2015.4.14.
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The main body of the ET is used for probabilities of events, whilst 
the probabilities of fatalities associated with the events are normally 
included as one cumulative number at the right hand end of the ET. 
This causes difficulties in finding contributions and sources of event-
related fatality probabilities, and, in general, the traceability may be 
difficult. There is a possibility of constructing an ET which would be 
large enough to include both the events probabilities and the fatalities 
probabilities associated with each event, but such an ET would be dif-
ficult to modify and manage.
  It takes time to build an ET and standard ET are often used. These 
provide a rapid first application, but tend to be rather coarse and their 
results may not be of a desired accuracy. ET also tends to be difficult 
to modify, which makes it time-consuming to explore various design 
alternatives. 
In most cases a method capable of modeling dynamic processes 
is required. In [1], risk analysis of offshore drilling by using Bow-tie 
analysis and real time barriers failure probability assessment of off-
shore drilling operation is shown. The need for better failure analysis 
of operational barriers in the offshore industry resulted in Barrier and 
Operational Risk Analysis (BORA) project [16] with methodology of 
BORA presented in [2].  
Risk management by taking into account the time-dependence of 
the event in the consequence assessment, by means of the application 
of the approach of the dynamic geoevent was presented in [10].
Another method, Monte Carlo (MC) simulation, was used in [7] 
to identify the most contributing factors to probability of fatality fol-
lowing hydrocarbon leak occurrence on an offshore platform. In last 
years, Petri Nets (PN) are frequently used as an alternative to ET 
method. Given lack of the biggest ET limitation, inability to represent 
dynamic processes, PN often lead to more desirable model of the risk 
to personnel in process industries. PN can substitute ET in representa-
tion of steady-state system. It is entirely possible to convert ET to PN 
with little difficulty [11]. As probability of event occurrence in PN can 
be time-dependent, it is also possible to represent a dynamic industry 
process by PN model based on steady-state representation in form of 
an ET model [15]. In [5], combination of PN and MC simulation was 
used to evaluate production availability of a multi-state, multi-output 
offshore installation with operational loops, where PN provided the 
necessary flexibility to describe the realistic aspects of system behav-
ior. In [14] Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) are used as guidelines 
to build large PN. RBD-driven PN are shown to be very effective in 
modeling safety systems. 
This paper presents a method whereby the time-dependent events 
and the time-dependent probability of fatality are modeled by means 
of an analytical method. A practical example and data from a typi-
cal offshore hydrocarbon production facility are used to quantify risk 
of injury or fatality of working personnel. A “Leak (Small, Medium, 
Large) in Zone 8”(see description of Zone 8 in Section 2) of a typi-
cal offshore hydrocarbon production installation is used as this event 
represents the highest frequency of potential hydrocarbon accidents 
on the typical offshore facility. The objective is quantification of prob-
ability of fatality of a person working and escaping from the separa-
tion and compression Zone 8.
The subject of this paper is complex. It is based, however, on 
data and experience from actual installations and life threatening 
incidents. The reader is therefore suggested to develop a “picture in 
the mind” of the typical installation as shown in Figure 1, and the 
“incident examples”. The application and incident basis as well as 
the detailed description of hydrocarbon-related incident with leaks are 
presented in Section 2. Section 3 focuses on the application of the 
analytical computation method based on modeling of scenarios by the 
use of directed acyclic graph (DAG) and Fault Tree (FTA) methods. 
The results of the quantification are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
presents conclusions reached in this paper.
2. Application example and incident basis 
Figure 1 shows an example of typical offshore production instal-
lation consisting of a wellhead platform (WHP), production and riser 
platform (PRP), and accommodation platform (AP), all connected by 
bridges. The installation is sub-divided into 10 Zones according to the 
nature of the plant or activities. Hydrocarbons being produced come 
up from a reservoir onto WHP in the form of multi-phase fluids, which 
are piped across the bridge to the PRP, where they are separated into 
oil, gas, and water and sand. Produced oil and gas are piped through 
risers and pipelines to a terminal located on-shore. Living quarters 
are provided on the AP, which is connected to PRP by a bridge. The 
installation is provided with a standby vessel, which would be located 
100m away from the installation.
The main risk on the installation is from potential leaks of the 
produced hydrocarbons on WHP or PRP. The primary escape and 
evacuation route from the installation is to the AP, where installation 
personnel evacuate by free-fall lifeboats. The three lifeboats shown 
in the Figure 1 are of the minimum capacity of the capacity of the in-
stallation. The secondary escape and evacuation route is to the WHP, 
which is equipped with one free-fall lifeboat. The WHP lifeboat ca-
pacity would be based on number of personnel on WHP plus PRP at 
any one time. Tertiary evacuation capacity is provided on WHP and 
PRP by life rafts.
In case of evacuation the evacuees are transferred by the lifeboats 
and life-rafts to the standby vessel. There are 36 personnel on the 
installation working in two 12-hours shifts. 26 persons are technical, 
who work in various areas of WHP and RPP and 10 service personnel 
such as cooks, cleaners, etc.
This paper focuses on the hydrocarbon-related risk, whereas the 
highest risk is in the wellheads and manifolds area on the WHP (Zone 
3) and then in the separation and compression area on the PRP (Zone 
8). The various areas are segregated by firewalls, blast walls, plated 
decks, various rooms and by distances. 
Leak frequencies in Zone 8 based on statistical observations may 
be estimated as follows:
Small leaks 609 per 10000 years,
Medium leaks 234 per 10000 years, and
Large leaks 216 per 10000 years.
A leak in Zone 8 would initiate the following actions:
Activation of fire & gas (F&G) system, which in turn would a) 
simultaneously activate
Alarm,b) 
Emergency shutdown of process and electrical systems,c) 
Blowdown of hydrocarbon plant inventories (see Note),d) 
Start of emergency power generation,e) 
Start of fire pumps, andf) 
Personnel would make their workplace safe and start to es-g) 
cape.
These actions normally happen within the first 1 minute on the 
leak detection.
The probability of ignition of the leaking hydrocarbon would be 
minimized by the shut-down and blowdown, but the leaking hydro-
carbon may still ignite immediately or with some delay. Immediate 
ignition of leaking pressurised gas would result in jet fire, whilst a 
relatively large gas cloud may accumulate and explode following a 
delayed ignition. Explosions or prolonged jet fires may damage the 
plant and structures of the installation. Calculations and trials show 
that personnel should be able to escape to the lifeboats and evacuate 
from the installation to the sea within 30 minutes after the start of the 
leak. 
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2.1. Problem formulation and application example
It is important to know the possible development/escalation of in-
cidents on the installation, and the implication on escaping personnel 
in first phases of the accident, as personnel may be trapped or injured 
by collapsing plant or structures with resultant fatalities. Table 1 sum-
marizes such events with associated probabilities for a person work-
ing and escaping from separation and compression Zone 8 on Level 2 
of the PRP, related to small, medium and large leaks respectively. Pis, 
Pim and Pil, Pfs, Pfm and Pfl, and Pes, Pem and Pel, denote the respective 
probabilities of ignition, hydrocarbon-related fatality and escalation 
to bridge for small, medium and large releases. Pf denotes the prob-
ability of fatality related to the escape to sea by jumping into the sea.
In Table 1 composed of data from [12], as for example, an im-
mediate ignition of a medium release with Pim = 0.03 may result in 
an immediate fatality of Pfm = 0.1. As an alternative, the person may 
escape unhurt from the leak area behind the nearest fire/blast wall and 
continue to the PRP-AP bridge, but the bridge may lose support due 
to the fire damage of PRP. As a result, the escaping person may be 
trapped by the PRP on fire and the damaged bridge and he/she may 
need to escape by jumping into the sea the secondary route to WHP. 
In this case, Pim = 0.03, Pem = 0.1 and Pf = 0.7.
Personnel escaping on the basis of scenarios described in Table 
1 may be exposed to an insufficient condition for evacuation (ICFE), 
which results in fatality, probability which is to be computed. The 
objective of this paper is quantification of probability of fatality of a 
person working and escaping from separation and compression Zone 
8. This probability is a time dependent function. We are particularly 
interested in behavior of the function during initial part of the acci-
dent. The initial event of the accident is a hydrocarbon leak and we are 
considering three sizes of the leak: small, medium and large. As Table 
1 illustrates, the leak is detected during the 1st minute, personnel start 
to escape, but the time of ignition varies (with associated probability) 
and so also varies the time of fatality with its associated probability.
3. Method
One possibility to find the probability of ICFE is the ET method. 
ET is an inductive logic methods for identifying the various accident 
sequences [8], which can generate from a single initiating event. The 
approach is based on the discretization of the real accident evolution 
in few macroscopic events. The accident sequences which derive are 
then quantified in terms of their probability of occurrence. But ETs, 
which are at present widely used for the estimation of risk, are steady 
state, whilst the configuration and actions of the systems analyzed 
may change with time, with associated probabilities of the changes 
and their outcomes. ET is not a good approach for the characteriza-
tion of dynamic evolution of time dependencies of the probability of 
ICFE (resulting in fatality). In this paper we use analytical method for 
this purpose, based on modeling of scenarios by the use of DAG and 
FTA as well.
Another possibility to solve the problem is using the direct MC 
simulation method, which is frequently used to solve dynamic prob-
lems [9]. The MC simulation method has formally existed since early 
1940’s, but only with increasing computer technology and power be-
came widely used. The MC method enables modelling of complex 
processes without the need of making unrealistic simplifying assump-
tions, as is inevitably done when using analytical methods. With the 
increasing availability of fast computers, MC methods become more 
powerful and feasible. The above-mentioned offshore problem was 
successfully solved by the MC method in [6, 7]. 
There are several events which can occur. We do not know when 
they occur or if they occur at all. But we know probability of their oc-
currence. We can simulate event occurrence times through these prob-
abilities. It is like we build an offshore platform model and study how 
the system and personnel reacts on different leak size and different 
ignition times.  As this approach would be obviously too expensive, 
we construct a virtual model which consists of events and their prob-
abilities and coherences between them. The key part of MC method is 
to define these events, probabilities and coherences (Table 1).
An example of one MC simulation: 
Small leak occurred. Alarm was activated. Installation was shut 
down and depressurization was started. Leak ignited after either 1 
or 2 minutes. Person was behind the firewall and survived the ex-
plosion. Person started escaping via stairs to the PRP-AP bridge. He 
succeeded to reach the Accommodation Platform. All events (type 
of leak, ignition time, persons surviving explosion) which occurred 
in our example were generated by random from given probabilities. 
This sequence of events is just one of possible scenarios generated by 
small leak. We cannot simulate all of them but enough to get suffi-
ciently accurate results obtained by statistical evaluation. But in some 
cases the application of the direct MC technique however suffers from 
slow convergence. If possible, analytical method for exact probability 
quantification may be used.
3.1. Analytical method for exact probability quantification
Main objective of the analytic method is to find the time evolution 
of the probability of occurrence of a TOP event during a mission time. 
One example of the TOP event to be analyzed is shown in Figure 2. 
The TOP event which in real emergency dangerous situation may be 
an event causing the ICFE (resulting in fatality) is demonstrated by 
the use of a DAG, originally described in [3]. A graph is composed 
of nodes and edges that are numbered. The highest node (TOP node) 
represents the TOP event, probability of which is to be calculated in 
a time evolution. Internal and terminal nodes represent source events, 
which are either sub-events (e.g. failure events on subsystems) or ter-
minal events (input events as random failures or accidents). All of the 
nodes are bounded by edges. Direction of the graph is not explicitly 
marked in Figure 2 it is given by itself - by projection to vertical direc-
tion. The graph is acyclic which means that two immediately bound 
nodes are connected just by one edge, i.e. it cannot contain feedback 
loops.
Nodes are numbered in the increasing order beginning from the 
highest TOP node. Internal numeration of nodes is such that a node 
cannot be inferior to a node with a greater number.
As Figure 2 shows, terminal nodes of the DAG are marked by 
black squares.  They represent stochastic behavior of input events 
mostly given by their probability distribution. Internal nodes (non-
terminal) are marked by black circles. They represent stochastic be-
havior of sub-events. A sub-event occurs in a given time point just 
in the case when the number of active inferior edges (i.e. number of 
inferior sub-events or terminal events that occurred at the same time 
point) reaches at least the number in parentheses, otherwise it does not 
occur. For example, the sub-event marked by 3(1) occurs just in the 
case when the number of active inferior edges is at least 1, i.e. when 
either the terminal event 2 (black square 2) or sub-event 6(3) occurs.
The DAG described above can be compared with Fault Tree (FT) 
or Success Tree, both are frequently used in PRA (Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment) methodology, where internal nodes represent logic gates. 
The DAG is more general representation than FT, because basic gates 
(AND, OR, etc.) do not require specific description but can be intro-
duced uniformly as internal nodes. Fault tree equivalently constructed 
to the DAG from Figure 2 is demonstrated in Figure 3.
As a first step of the analysis we have to find the time evolution 
of the probability of ICFE (TOP event) during a mission time, which 
was fixed to 300 sec (i.e. 5 min). The ICFE may be reached either by 
Scenario 1, initiated by ignition within interval 0-1 min (node 2(1) in 
Figure 2), Scenario 2, initiated by ignition within 1-2 min (node 3(1) 
in Figure 2), or Scenario 3,  initiated by the ignition within 2-5 min 
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Table 1. Person and installation actions at various times [6]
Plant/ Person 0 to 1min 1min to 2mins 2 to 5mins 5 to 8mins 8 to 10mins 10 to 30mins
Plant
-Leak in Zone 8.
-Leak detection.
-Alarm activated.
-installation shutdown.
-Depressurisation starts.
-ignition, Pis=0.004; 
Pim=0.03; Pil=0.1.
-Fire starts.
-Fire continues im-
pinging on flanges 
and structure.
-installation being 
depressurised.
-Flanges lose their 
tightness resulting 
in escalation to addi-
tional fire(s).
-Loss of strength of 
PRP topside resulting 
in damage of the PRP-
AP bridge. Pes=0.05, 
Pem=0.1, Pel=0.5.
Person
-Person working in Zone 8.
-Making working area safe.
-Considering the situa-
tion, deciding which way 
to escape and starting to 
escape.
-Fatality, Pfs=0.05; Pfm=0.1; 
Pfl=0.3.
-Escaping person 
located behind the 
nearest fire/blast 
wall.
-Fatality, Pfs=0.01; 
Pfm=0.02; Pfl=0.06.
-Escaping via stairs to 
the PRP-AP bridge.
-Person trapped be-
cause of the PRP-AP 
bridge damage and 
the escalating fires 
in PRP.
-Person escapes to 
the sea.
-Fatality, Pf=0.7.
Escaping person on 
the PRP-AP bridge.
-Person trapped be-
cause of the PRP-AP 
bridge damage and 
the escalating fires 
in PRP.
-Person escapes to 
the sea.
-Fatality, Pf=0.7.
Plant
-Leak in Area 8.
-Leak detection.
-Alarm activated.
-installation shutdown.
-Depressurisation starts.
-ignition, Pis=0.006; 
Pim=0.04, Pil=0.2.
-Fire impinging on 
flanges and struc-
tures.
-installation being 
depressurised.
-Flanges lose their 
tightness resulting 
in escalation to addi-
tional fire(s).
-Loss of strength of 
PRP topside result-
ing in damage of the 
PRP-AP bridge.
Pes=0.05, Pem=0.1, 
Pel=0.5.
Person
-Person working in Zone 8.
-Making working area safe.
-Considering the situa-
tion, deciding which way 
to escape and starting to 
escape.
-Escaping person 
located behind the 
nearest fire/blast 
wall.
-Fatality, Pfs=0.01; 
Pfm=0.02; Pfl=0.06.
-Person escaping via 
stairs to the PRP-AP 
bridge.
-Fatality, Pfs=0.005; 
Pfm=0.01; Pfl=0.03.
-Escaping person on 
the PRP-AP bridge.
-Person trapped be-
cause of the PRP-AP 
bridge damage and 
the escalating fires 
in PRP.
-Person escapes to 
the sea.
-Fatality, Pf=0.7.
Plant
-Leak in Zone 8.
-Leak detection.
-Alarm activated.
-installation shutdown.
-Depressurisation starts.
-un-ignited leak 
continues.
-installation being 
depressurised.
-ignition, Pis=0.007; 
Pim=0.05, Pil=0.2.
-Fire impinging on 
flanges and structures.
-installation being 
depressurised.
-Flanges lose their 
tightness resulting in 
escalation to addi-
tional fire(s).
-Loss of 
strength of 
PRP topside 
resulting in 
damage of 
the PRP-AP 
bridge.
Pes=0.05, 
Pem=0.1, 
Pel=0.5.
Person
-Person working in Zone 8.
-Making working area safe.
-Considering the situa-
tion, deciding which way 
to escape and starting to 
escape.
-Escaping person 
located behind the 
nearest fire/blast 
wall.
-Person escaping via 
stairs to the PRP-AP 
bridge.
-Fatality, Pfs=0.003; 
Pfm=0.005; Pfl=0.02.
-Escaping person on 
the PRP-AP bridge. -Person reach-
es the AP.
-Embarkation 
into the life-
boats on the AP.
-Lifeboats 
launched, sail-
ing away from 
the AP and 
reaching the 
standby vessel.
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(node 4(1) in Figure 2); see Table 1. All three scenarios 
are mutually exclusive events. We see further in Figure 
2 that terminal nodes 6, 8 and 9 are dependent events, 
because these events are repeating in both Scenarios 1 
and 2 (6 is fatality behind the nearest fire/blast wall, 8 
is PRP-AP bridge damage and 9 is fatality caused by 
escaping person to the sea).
Now we use the assumption that all events occur-
ring in Table 1 follow exponential distribution. For ex-
ample, ignition probability Pis = 0.004 from 0 to 1 min 
means, that the event “ignition at small leak” is expo-
nentially distributed event which occurs within interval 
(0,1) with probability 0.004, so that corresponding pa-
rameter of failure rate is λ=6.68×10-5/s. Table 2 brings 
failure rates of all events occurring in Table 1 together 
with their given probabilities. Using the methodology 
for high-performance computing described in [3], the 
time evolution of the probability of ICFE (causing fatal-
ity) can be computed.
Analytical quantification procedure applied to a 
graph structure, which considers both independent and 
dependent (i.e. repeatedly occurring) terminal nodes, 
is based on combinatorial principle. The probability 
of TOP event can be obtained upwards resulting from 
probabilities of inferior terminal nodes. For instance the 
probability of internal event 3(1) can be computed in 
two steps: 
Step 1 – numerical expression of the probability of 
occurrence of inferior terminal event 2 and sub-event 
 6(3), i.e. q2 and q6
Step 2 – numerical expression of the probability of occurrence of 
internal node 3(1) is given as follows:
 )1.().1(. 6262623 qqqqqqq −+−+=  
In general, we go over all combinations of input events causing 
occurrence of superior event (here node 3(1)) and summarize prob-
abilities of such combinations. This principle requires summation of 
numerous different non-negative numbers, which may be one source 
of inaccuracy. Another source of inaccuracy arises when TOP event is 
a rare event (e.g. small leak within first minute after the accident ap-
pears). In such situation, the algorithm faces the problem of subtrac-
tion of two numbers that are very close each to other – an error may 
be committed at the arithmetic operation. Both these sources of in-
accuracy were eliminated in the new computing methodology. Exact 
quantification procedure for probability of TOP event was developed 
in [4] displaying very high computational efficiency, as demonstrated 
in the reference. Original algorithm from [3] based on DAG was radi-
cally innovated. The innovative algorithm uses merits of the high-per-
formance language for technical computing – MATLAB.  
Fig. 2. Example of Directed Acyclic Graph
Fig. 3. Fault tree as an equivalent structure to DAG from Fig. 2
Table 2. Data of terminal events
Event λj [s
-1] small λj [s
-1] medium λj [s
-1] large
iGn 0-1 6.68×10-5 5.08×10-4 1.76×10-3
FAt 0-1 5.95×10-3 8.55×10-4 1.75×10-3
FAt 1-2 1.0×10-3 8.37×10-5 1.68×10-4
PRP-AP 1.07×10-4 2.2×10-4 1.0×10-3
ESC-SEA 2.5×10-3 2.5×10-3 2.5×10-3
FAt 2-5 1.67×10-5 3.35×10-5 1.0×10-4
iGn 1-2 1.0×10-4 3.4×10-4  3.7×10-3
iGn 2-5 2.34×10-5 1.71×10-4 7.4×10-4
FAt 2-5* 1.0×10-5 1.67×10-5 6.7×10-5
λj … failure rate of the jth event
IGN 0-1  … ignition within time interval (0,1) min
FAT 0-1 … fatality within time interval (0,1) min 
FAT 1-2 … fatality within time interval (1,2) min 
PRP-AP … damage of PRP-AP bridge 
ESC-SEA … fatality due to escaping to the sea 
FAT 2-5 … fatality within time interval (2,5) min for Scenario 2
IGN 1-2 … ignition within time interval (1,2) min 
IGN 2-5 … ignition within time interval (2,5) min 
FAT 2-5* … fatality within time interval (2,5) min for Scenario 3
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4. Results
4.1. Results of method based on DAG
Using the innovative analytic method described above, two differ-
ent quantitative risk characteristics can be computed for each size of 
leak: the time-dependent evolution of the probability of the TOP event 
during selected first stage of the fire accident and average probability 
of the TOP event during selected consecutive time intervals. The lat-
ter characteristics are particularly useful to evaluate critical height of 
probability jumps within accident evolution.  
It can be seen in Figures 4 and 5 that the probability of ICFE at 
the end of 5th min is 6.3e-3 for small leak and about one order of mag-
nitude greater for medium leak. There is about 50% chance to survive 
the fire accident at the same time, for a person exposed to large leak.  
Average probabilities of ICFE in the course of consecutive min-
utes are demonstrated in Figure 6. It may be seen that for small and 
medium leak the highest jump of probability occurs within 5th minute 
in comparison with probability jumps in previous minutes. Conse-
quently, we can conclude that 5th minute is most critical time point for 
safety of personnel. On the other side the probability of fatality in 5th 
minute for small leak is comparable with the probability in 2nd minute 
for medium leak and with the probability of fatality in 1th minute for 
large leak as well.
A large leak is very dangerous, because its associated probability 
of fatality increases approximately evenly within each minute very 
rapidly (at about 0.1 per one minute). 
4.2. Partial sensitivity analysis
When applying the quantitative risk assessment in practice we of-
ten face the problem of lack of data. Using realistic data from [12], 
shown in Table 1, we were pushed into assuming that all input events 
follow exponential distribution. Of course, given that used realistic 
data contain only probability values in prescribed times, the most suit-
able probability distribution is thus exponential distribution, which is 
frequently used for modeling of random events in reliability theory. 
In addition, the source data of Table 1 is unavailable, therefore we are 
not allowed to verify this assumption.
As an exponential distribution function is determined by its rate 
parameter λ, we carried out partial sensitivity analysis for small leak 
to explore to which extent the resulting probability of ICFE is influ-
enced by the parameter. For this reason the qualitative analysis dis-
covering all minimal cuts has been made. Two of them (the most fre-
quent ones) minimal cuts were chosen: C1={IGN 0-1, FAT 0-1} and 
C2={IGN 1-2, FAT 1-2}, that  can be considered the most significant 
contributions to ICFE, if only because they are disjoint sets.  Param-
eter λ of all basic events contained in C1 and C2 was modified into 
two sided 30% interval of λ. Computational results for probability of 
ICFE assuming lower and upper bounds of λ were obtained within 
300 sec time course. Final bounds of probability of ICFE at 300 sec 
were computed as follows:
Fig. 4. Probability of ICFE (logarithmic scale) for Large, Medium (middle 
line) and Small (lower) Leak
Fig. 5. Probability of ICFE for Large, Medium (middle line) and Small (low-
er) Leak
Fig. 6. Average Probabilities of ICFE for Large, Medium (middle line) and 
Small (bottom) Leaks, per Particular Minute
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Table 3. Probability of ICFE depending on values of λ of two most frequent 
minimal cuts:
Rate parameters/probabilities iCFE [s-1] iCFE change [%]
λ 6,6×10-3 0
Lower bound λ 3,5×10-3 -47
upper bound λ 1,0×10-2 +53
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As shown in Table 3, change of λ parameter led to significant 
change of ICFE probability. In case of λ value lowered by 30%, cor-
responding ICFE probability was also lowered by 47%. In case of λ 
value raised by 30%, corresponding ICFE probability was raised by 
53%. Both these results show high sensitivity of ICFE probability to 
the value of rate parameter λ, therefore stressing the need of correct 
choice of λ value in FT and DAG models utilizing exponential dis-
tribution. 
5. Conclusions
This paper demonstrates new approach to evaluate risk of fatal-
ity of working personnel in process industries from fire caused by 
hydrocarbon leak ignition occurring at various times following the 
leak. The new approach is characterized by its ability to compute 
time-dependent evolution of probability of personnel fatality, which 
is impossible by applying steady state methods. 
Computed results were obtained by the use of analytical method 
coming from DAG as a system representation, which was fully inno-
vated using merits of the high-performance language MATLAB. 
Despite the fact that obtained results are influenced by addition 
of new assumptions laid on events occurring in Table 1 (putting 
them into the framework of exponential distribution), we can con-
clude that good platform for quantification of probability of ICFE 
is at our disposal.
Factually, data in Table 1 has been used to compute the time-
dependent probability of ICFE for small, medium and large leaks in 
Zone 8. Based on the dynamic evolution of the probability of ICFE, 
it can be concluded that the most dangerous leak is the large leak. 
Probability of fatality following large leak increases very rapidly 
within first 5 minutes. At the end of 5th minute, person has roughly 
50% chance to survive large leak scenario. This can be attributed to 
ignition of large gas cloud resulting in a fire swiftly escalating outside 
Zone 8 or outright explosion, both damaging the construction and thus 
possibly blocking some evacuation routes. On the other hand, small 
leak scenario is the least dangerous one, as the only danger comes 
from delayed ignition resulting in an explosion of accumulated gas 
vapors. The results also demonstrate that at the end of 5th minute, 
there is approximately one order of magnitude difference in the prob-
abilities of fatality associated with the respective leak sizes. 
If we wish to represent the probability for ICFE per annum, we 
have to multiply these probabilities by leak frequencies in Zone 8 
based on statistical observations, see above the Section 2.
Finally, the partial sensitivity analysis showed that the final prob-
ability of ICFE is correspondingly influenced by variability of input 
parameters. Nevertheless by all means the obtained results are of spe-
cial relevance to draw a comparison between different sizes of leaks. 
Future research in this area should be oriented to finding ef-
fective measures leading to the risk of personnel fatality reduction, 
especially in the first minutes after the leak and follow-up fire ac-
cident occurrence.
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